Aging of a giant: a stochastic population forecast for China, 2001-2050 by Qiang Li et al.
Max-Planck-Institut für demografische Forschung
Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research
Konrad-Zuse-Strasse 1 · D-18057 Rostock · GERMANY
Tel +49 (0) 3 81 20 81 - 0; Fax +49 (0) 3 81 20 81 - 202; 
http://www.demogr.mpg.de
This working paper has been approved for release by: Jutta Gampe (gampe@demogr.mpg.de)
Head of the Office of Statistics and Information Services.
© Copyright is held by the authors.
Working papers of the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research receive only limited review.
Views or opinions expressed in working papers are attributable to the authors and do not necessarily
reflect those of the Institute.
Aging of a giant: 
a stochastic population forecast for
China, 2001-2050





Juha Alho (etunimi.sukunimi@ joensuu.fi)  1 
AGING OF A GIANT: A STOCHASTIC POPULATION 
FORECAST FOR CHINA, 2001-2050 
 
Dr. Qiang Li, 
† Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research 
Ph.D student Mieke Reuser, Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute 
Dr. Cornelia Kraus, Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research 
Prof. Dr. Juha Alho, University of Joensuu 
 
Affiliations:  
† Address for correspondence: Qiang Li, Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, 
D-18057 Rostock, Germany. Email: li@demogr.mpg.de. 
Mieke Reuser 
Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI), 2505 AR, The Hague. 
Email: Reuser@nidi.nl 
Cornelia Kraus 
Max  Planck  Institute  for  Demographic  Research,  D-18057  Rostock,  Germany.  Email: 
kraus@demogr.mpg.de 
Juha Alho 
University of Joensuu, Department of Computer Science and Statistics, Box 111, 80101 
Joensuu, Finland. Email: etunimi.sukunimi@ joensuu.fi 
 
   2 
Abstract 
This paper presents a stochastic population forecast for China with a special emphasis on 
population  aging.  Stochastic  forecasting  methods  have  the  advantage  of  producing  a 
projection of the future population including a probabilistic prediction interval. The so-
called  scaled  model  for  error  was  used  to  quantify  the  uncertainty  attached  to  the 
population  predictions  in  this  study.  Data  scarcity  was  a  major  problem  in  the 
specification  of  the  expected  error  of  the  population  forecast.  Therefore,  the  error 
structures  estimated  for  European  countries  were  employed  with  some  modifications 
taking  the  large  size  and  heterogeneity  of  the  Chinese  population  into  account.  The 
stochastic forecast confirms the expectation of extremely rapid population aging during 
the first half of the 21st century in China. The old age dependency ratio (OADR) will 
increase with certainty. By mid-century, with 80% probability, the OADR will lie between 
0.41 and 0.56, with the median of the predictive distribution being 0.48, nearly five-fold 
its current value of 0.1. In particular, the oldest-old population will grow faster than any 
other age group. This development has major implications for China: to smoothly adjust 
current birth control policies to less restrictive ones, strengthen the family support system, 
and improve the social security system for the elderly.  
 
 
Keywords:  stochastic population forecast, predictive distribution, uncertainty, 
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Introduction 
China, with more than one-fifth of the world’s inhabitants, represents a significant factor 
in  the  development of  the  world’s  population.  As  a  result of  a  dramatically  declining 
fertility and a steadily increasing life expectancy, China’s population is currently aging at 
a rapid rate. In 1982, the proportion of the elderly (65 and older) 
1 was 4.91% of the total 
population, and this share increased to 5.57% and 6.81% in 1990 and 2000, respectively. 
In China it may take only about 20 years for the elderly population to increase from five to 
seven percent, while in many developed countries it usually takes about 50 to 80 years to 
develop the same level of population aging (Li 2005). Hence, population aging is likely to 
be one of the great challenges China will face in the near future.  
As in most countries, the phenomenon of population aging in China results from the 
combined forces of mortality improvement and declining fertility, the latter process being 
especially  pronounced  due  to  Chinese  birth  control  policies.  In  February  2006,  the 
Chinese government announced the continuation of its birth planning policies. Starting 
with the restrictive one-child policy in 1980, these policies have moved to a one-child 
policy in urban areas
2 and a 1.5-child policy in rural areas (e.g., if the first child is a girl, 
the couple is allowed to have a second child, Zeng and George 2000). These policies, 
prescribing a below-replacement level of fertility by law, have a large effect on recent and 
future fertility, leading to an acceleration of population aging. The effects of these policies 
will also reduce family size, and consequently influence family support for older adults, 
such as instrumental and financial support, as well as care-giving and emotional support -- 
factors playing a major role in taking care of the elderly in China (Zimmer and Kwong 
2003).  
Mortality in China has declined steeply over the past 50 years, especially in the early 
years  of  the  People’s  Republic  of  China  (Banister  and  Hill  2004;  Riley  2004).  Life 
expectancy has increased from 48 years in 1950-1954 to over 71 years by 2000 (Banister 
and Hill 2004). Much of the mortality decline can be attributed to the decline in infant and 
childhood mortality rates achieved by an overall increase in the standard of living and the 
educational level of the Chinese population (Banister and Hill 2004; Riley 2004). With 
further improvement of socio-economic development, this mortality decline is likely to 
continue in the near future.   4 
The Chinese social security system for the elderly is currently being transformed from 
a solely government-financed system to a government-subsided one. There are limited 
numbers of older people who receive a pension (Zhang and Xiao 1999). For example, in 
1987, 63.7% of the elderly living in urban areas received pensions, and 56.63% and 4.7% 
in small towns and the countryside, respectively (Zhang and Xiao 1999). The coverage of 
medical care cost is about 50% for employees in the cities and less than 10% for rural 
inhabitants (Woo et al. 2002). Most of the older people in China are poor and cannot 
support themselves. Furthermore, with family size declining, the younger generation will 
not be able to offer the traditional family care, even if they are willing to do so (Li 2005). 
Therefore, projecting the Chinese population into the near future is of high importance   
also for providing the relevant demographic background for appropriate socio-economic 
policy decisions.  
Forecasting  the  Chinese  population  is  a  challenging  task.  Firstly,  China  has  been 
experiencing major demographic changes in the recent past. The implementation of birth 
control policies starting  in 1970, especially the  introduction of the one-child policy  in 
1980, has resulted in a rapid fertility decline. The high rate of economic growth since the 
Reform and Open-up policy in 1978 has improved public health and living conditions, 
whereas the collapse of the healthcare system has negatively impacted the population’s 
health status, and both have jointly affected the average life expectancy. Secondly, data 
available  for  forecasting  are  very  scarce.  Census  data  for  only  four  time  points  are 
available for forecasting mortality. Somewhat more data on fertility are available, but data 
quality is not too high. For example, fertility rates have been underestimated in several 
surveys and even in census data. Moreover, estimates for total fertility rate (TFR) based on 
different  data  sources  are  not  consistent  with  each  other.  Stochastic  approaches  to 
forecasting cope with these kinds of uncertainty by assuming a probability distribution for 
the projected parameters. Several methods for stochastic forecasting have been proposed 
previously (e.g., Lee and Carter 1992; Alho and Spencer 2005). In this study the so-called 
scaled model for error is employed, which has been developed by Alho and Spencer (2005: 
280-283)  and  which  has  been  extensively  applied  to  the  projection  of  European 
populations (e.g., Alho and Nikander 2004; Alho et al. 2006).  
To  date,  most  population  forecasts  for  China  have  used  deterministic  projections, 
which assess the range of possible outcomes by high and low scenarios. Deterministic 
models  have  some  drawbacks,  however.  It  is  not  clear  how  to  interpret  a  population   5 
variable’s high -- low range unless a corresponding probability for the range is provided 
(Li, Lee and Tuljapukar 2004). In addition, alternative scenarios based on judgment have 
tended to under-predict mortality declines and gains in life expectancy when compared 
with the subsequent outcomes (Keilman 1997, 2001; Lee and Miller 2001). These errors 
have led to under-prediction of the elderly population, and particularly the oldest-old (Li, 
Lee  and  Tuljapukar  2004),  which  could  impede  population  aging  research.  To  our 
knowledge, there are only two stochastic forecasts for China: one is a mortality forecast by 
Li, Lee and Tuljapukar (2004); the other, by Lutz et al. (2005), is a population forecast 
based on expert opinion rather than empirical analysis. However, neither of these two 
studies provides a detailed analysis of population aging. 
This  study  reports  the  results  of  a  stochastic  forecast  of  the  Chinese  population 
between  2001  and  2050.  The  forecasting  approach  follows  Alho  and  Spencer  (2005). 
Focusing on population aging, the main aims are to (i) provide probabilistic predictions of 
total population size and (ii) to quantify the level and rate of the population aging process 
using various indicators of age structure. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
introduces  the  data  sources  and  forecasting  methods  and  assumptions  for  population 
processes. Stochastic forecasting results are provided in Section 3. Section 4 concludes the 
study  by  summarizing  the  main  forecasting  results  on  population  aging  and  briefly 
discusses their policy implications. 
 
Materials and methods 
Data sources 
The sources of data used in this projection are detailed in Table 1. Jump-off population 
data are based on the 2000 census. Fertility data mainly come from the 2000 census and 
the surveys conducted by State Family Planning Commission of China (SFPC) in 1982, 
1988, 1992, 1997 and 2001. Some additional fertility data are provided by the National 
Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS). Mortality data are from three censuses undertaken by 
NBS in 1982, 1990 and 2000, as well as the Cancer Epidemiology Survey carried out by 
the Ministry of Health in the 1970s.  
---- Table 1 is here -----   6 
Forecasting method 
Stochastic population  forecasts are calculated by using cohort-component bookkeeping 
under  a  linear  (Leslie)  growth  model,  with  a  deterministic  jump-off  population  and 
probabilistically varying values for age-specific fertility, age-sex-specific mortality, and 
net migration flows by sex and age. The scaled model for error was applied to specify 
uncertainty (Alho and Spencer 2005: 280-283). It assumes that the demographic rate for 
age j at forecast year t (t>0) can be expressed as follows: 
)) , ( exp( ) , ( ) , ( t j X t j F t j R = , 
where F(j,t) is the point forecast and X(j,t) is the error process which is modeled by a 
random  walk  with  a  drift  (in  t).  The  error  process  is  of  the 
form ) , ( ... ) 1 , ( ) , ( t j j t j X e e + + = , where the error increments are given by 
)) , ( )( , ( ) , ( t j t j S t j j d h e + = . 
Here, S(j,t) is always positive and can be seen as a weight or scale on the error term 
) , ( t j e . If an appropriate S(j,t) is chosen, a random walk with a drift will replicate the 
errors  in  the  future  well.  j h  represents  the  error  in  the  forecasted  trends,  and  ) , ( t j d  
describes the random fluctuations around these trends. It is assumed that for each j, the 
variables  ) , ( t j d  are  independent  over  time.  Additionally,  the  variables  ) , ( t j d  are 
assumed independent of the variables j h  with both following a normal distribution:  
) , 0 ( ~ ) ( j k N j h ;  ) 1 , 0 ( ~ ) , ( j k N t j - d , 
where  1 0 < < j k  are known. In addition, autoregressive (AR(1)) correlation structures on 
j h  and  ) , ( t j d  across age (fertility and mortality) and sex (mortality and net migration) 
are assumed:  
| | )) , ( ), , ( ( )) ( ), ( (
j i t j t i Corr j i Corr
- = = r d d h h  for some  1 0 £ £ r . 
Since the increments are scaled by the S(j,t), the model is called the scaled model for 
error.  The  function  of  the  correlation  parameters  in  terms  of  age  is  to  represent  the 
phenomenon that  forecast errors of vital rates  in close ages tend to be similar,  but in 
distant ages they may be quite different.    7 
Note that  )) , ( ), , ( ( h t j t j Corr k j + = e e for  all  h  ≠  0.  Therefore, the  kj  indicates the 
independence or dependence of time and is always between 0 and 1. Under a random walk 
model,  the  error  increments  would  be  uncorrelated,  with  kj=0.  Empirical  studies  on 
European countries have shown that this may be appropriate in fertility forecasting (Alho 
and  Spencer  2005:  254-255).  When 1 0 < < j k ,  a  random  walk  with  a  drift  is  defined. 
Again, empirical data from Europe suggest a random walk with a drift  in the case of 
mortality and net migration forecasting (Alho and Spencer 2005: 255-256).  
Alho and Spencer (2005: Ch. 8) distinguish three different methods to determine the 
predictive distribution for the vital rates: (1) extrapolation of time-series data, (2) expert 
opinion and (3) assessment of accuracy of past forecasts. However, in order to apply time-
series extrapolation methods, long and accurate data series from the past are necessary, 
which are not available in the case of China. Thus, point estimates for fertility, mortality, 
and  migration were based on the scarce  information available and expert opinion (see 
Section “Assumptions for population processes”). The data available for China are too 
scarce to estimate country-specific levels of uncertainty based on the so-called “naive” or 
baseline forecasts which estimate the forecast error as the median level of uncertainty in 
the past. Therefore, this study borrows the forecasting error structure estimated by Alho 
and Spencer (2005) applying the scaled model for error to some European countries. With 
regard to China’s huge population, however, some downward adjustments of the European 
values of scale S(j,t) were made. This seems appropriate because past forecasts of China 
have been more accurate than those of European countries (Bongaarts and Bulatao 2000).  
A general empirical finding is that forecasts of large countries have tended to be more 
accurate than those of smaller countries (Alho and Spencer 2005: 261). Intuitively, the 
better accuracy appears to be due to the fact that large countries often consist of somewhat 
independent sub-populations. Thus, the aggregate behaves in a more stable manner than 
the parts. Borgy and Alho (2007) used a similar approach to forecast the population for 
regions lacking demographic data of sufficient quality. In this study, the three scales of 
fertility, mortality and international migration were multiplied by three constants, whereas 
in the Borgy and Alho study all uncertainty parameters were multiplied by one constant 
only.  
For fertility, mortality and migration, it was assumed that the uncertainty increases 
with  the  time  forecasted  and  that  the  variances  of  the  demographic  processes  are   8 
independent of each other. The errors for fertility are assumed to follow a random walk 
with kj=0, while for mortality the autocorrelation of errors is presumed to increase, thus 
specifying  a  random  walk  with  a  drift,  with  kj=0.05.  The  uncertainty  of  migration  is 
expressed in absolute numbers and is again modeled by a random walk with a drift, with 
kj=0.3. The specification details of uncertainty parameters for the three vital events will be 
discussed shortly. 
The forecast was made using the BEGIN (Yanulevskaya and Alho 2005) and PEP 
(Program for Error Propagation, Alho and Mustonen 2003) programs, which are based on 
the scaled model for error. BEGIN creates the forecasting error parameters and produces 
output data files that serve as input in a subsequent PEP run. The cohort component model 
was run 3000 times in PEP to determine the probability distribution of future population 
size and structure. Forecasting results are reported as median with the accompanying 80% 
prediction  interval,  because  in  most  cases  80%  intervals  give  a  better  impression  of 
forecast uncertainty than the more usual 95% intervals, which reflect extremes (Alders, 
Keilman, and Cruijsen 2007). 
 
Assumptions for population processes 
Jump-off population    
The latest time point for which detailed population data for China is available is the census 
of 2000 conducted by the Chinese NBS. It provides information on the population by age 
(up to 100+) and sex. The reference time for the census is 00:00, November 1, 2000. Total 
population was 1,265 million in 2000. The 2000 population census was conducted on a de 
jure basis. The de jure count included all persons who hold the nationality of, and have 
their permanent place of residence
3 in the People’s Republic of China. During the census, 
each person was enumerated in his/her permanent place of residence and should have been 
enumerated in one place only (Population Census Office 2002).  
With  regards  to  the  quality  of  the  jump-off  population  data,  the  post-enumeration 
sample survey indicated an undercount of 1.81% in the census enumeration (Population 
Census  Office,  2002).  Thus,  it  was  necessary  to  adjust the  age-sex-distribution  of  the 
jump-off population before forecasting.  Based on the population census data in 1982 and 
1990, as well as annual population size from 1981 to 2000 reported by NBS in 2002, 
Wang Guangzhou (2004) used survival analysis and target analysis to analyze, evaluate   9 
and adjust the age-sex structure data in the 2000 census. The total population size from 
Wang’s estimation was 1.261 billion – close to the 1.265 billion reported by NBS.  
To obtain  a  jump-off  population  starting  at  the  turn  of  the  year,  Wang’s  adjusted 
population estimate was projected forward to 31 December 2000 under the assumption 
that  mortality  and  fertility  in  the  last  two  months  were  constant  across  months.  This 
procedure resulted in a jump-off population of 1.260 billion at the end of the year.
4 Given 
the quality of the jump-off population data, additional errors could have been considered 
in this forecast model. Unfortunately, the current version of PEP does not allow including 
this kind of uncertainty.  
 
Fertility 
The latest source of information on age-specific fertility in China comes from the 2000 
census. The TFR according to the census was 1.23. However, undercounts were estimated 
at 25% in the post-enumeration sample survey, suggesting that the real TFR had been 1.62 
in 2000 (Retherford et al. 2005; Guo 2006; Zeng 2006). The age-specific fertility rates 
(ASFR) were adjusted accordingly. The lowest age for which fertility rates are available is 
15 years and the highest age is 49 years. The ASFR for 2000 are abridged in 5-year age 
groups. The coefficients of the Karup-King formula were used to break these groups down 
to single-year fertility rates (Shryock 1976).
5  
Fertility assumptions for China in the forecast were based on the past trends in fertility 
in 1950-2000 and birth control policies. The latter have played a crucial role on fertility 
decline and population control in China, and will also affect future fertility levels. Before 
1970,  TFR  fluctuated  strongly.  The  dramatic  decline  at the  end  of  the  1950s  and  the 
beginning  of  the  1960s  were  due  to  the  Great  Leap  Forward  beginning  in  1957,  and 
subsequently the catastrophic famine of 1959-1962. After that, the TFR increased to a 
higher level than before the Great Leap Forward and the famine (Figure 1: TFR, 1950-
2000). In the past three decades, the fertility trend in China has been dominated by the 
impact  of  the  “delayed  childbirth  (wan),  longer  birth  intervals  (xi),  and  fewer  births 
(shao)”  policy  of  the  1970s, the  famous  one-child  policy  introduced  in  1980,  and  the 
current policy of allowing one-child in urban areas and 1.5-child in rural areas (from 1984 
onwards, couples are allowed to have a second child if the first child is a girl). As a result 
of  these  policies,  the  fertility  declined  dramatically  from  5.79  to  2.75  in  the  1970s,   10 
fluctuated between a maximum value of 2.86 and a minimum of 2.19 during the 1980s, 
and  then  fell  substantially  in  the  1990s.  Despite  differences  in  TFR  estimated  from 
different data sources, the declining trend in fertility during the 1990s is evident (Figure 1: 
TFR, 1950-2000).  
---- Figure 1 is here ----- 
According to the current birth control policies, the TFR target is 1.47 (Guo 2004; Gu 
et al. 2007).
6  Since China announced in February 2006 it would continue these policies
 ,
7 
the downward trend is expected to continue until the target TFR 1.47 is achieved in the 
near future. The year in which the target TFR will be/has been reached was estimated 
based on the trend of the past TFR. Since the data from the sampling surveys undertaken 
by SFPC  in the 1990s turned out to be severely  biased on the  low side (a regression 
suggested that the target TFR had been already reached in 1995), the estimation simply 
extrapolated the linear trend determined by two well-supported data points, namely 1985 
and 2000 (undercount corrected census data). The 1985 survey data was used instead of 
the 1982 census data because the TFR in 1982 was exceptionally high. Thus, the steepness 
of the fertility decline would likely have been overestimated, which would have led to an 
unrealistically early reaching of the target TFR. The high TFR of 1982 is likely a period 
effect due to a short-term reaction of the Chinese population to the one-child policy and 
the 1980 Marriage Law (Griffith et al. 1989). The 1980 Marriage Law resulted in many 
more marriages in the early 1980s than in the 1970s; many marriages were postponed 
from  the  1970s  to  the  beginning  of  the  1980s,  and  subsequently  led  to  a  peak  in 
childbirths. The scenario we have described suggests that the target TFR had been reached 
in 2004 (Figure 1), which is close to Guo’s (2004) simulation where the target TFR would 
be reached in 2005.  
In the point forecast of TFR it was assumed that the target TFR of 1.47 could be kept 
constant  in  the  future,  i.e.,  until  2050.  This  assumption  is  based  on  the  following 
considerations. There is no sign at the moment that China will loosen its birth control 
policies, for example, allowing every couple to have two children. Moreover, previous 
studies have reported a declining trend in the Chinese fertility ideal, from 3 in the 1970s to 
1.66 in 2002 (Chen and Zhang 2002; Parish and Whyte 1978; Wang 1996). Furthermore, 
young generations have accepted and internalized the policy into their culture in many 
places, especially in big cities such as Shanghai, Beijing, Dalian and Shenyang (Nie and 
Wyman  2005).  Particularly,  young  Chinese  women  today  are  more  likely  to  consider   11 
childbearing  not  as  a  necessity,  but  as  a  choice.  This  may  also  be  due  to  the  rising 
competition in the labor market as well as the costs of having more than one child.  
The  scaled  model  for  error  was  used  to  specify  the  uncertainty  of  the  fertility 
assumption. Given the very limited data available for China, this study borrowed the basic 
error structure provided by programs BEGIN and PEP. The default values in BEGIN and 
PEP were estimated by Alho and Spencer (2005: 253-255) using six European countries 
(Denmark, Finland, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden) over the time span 
starting  between  1751  and  1900,  and  ending  in  2000.  This  period  includes  much 
turbulence in fertility patterns in the countries studied, e.g., the “baby boom” and the rapid 
fertility declines at the end of the baby boom. Thus, the error structures derived can also 
serve as a plausible starting point for other countries and areas, such as China. It seems 
reasonable to assume that uncertainty patterns in China’s fertility resemble the European 
error structures to some extent.  
The current birth control policies are actually localized, that is, local governments have 
modified the state policy of population control in their prefectures according to their own 
situation, under the general principle of slowing down population growth and encouraging 
only one child per couple (Gu et al. 2007). As a result, different policies are applied within  
the  total  population,  i.e.,  35.4% of  the  population  fell  under  the  one-child  policy  and 
53.6% the 1.5-children policy at the end of 1990s (Gu et al. 2007). The target TFR of 1.47 
was estimated based on local fertility policies and corresponding population distribution 
(Gu et al. 2007). Borders and classification (urban versus rural) of China’s prefectures are 
changing frequently, and accordingly, the number of people subject to different policies is 
also changing. This will likely result in some turbulence in the TFR during the forecasting 
period. In addition, there is still some possibility to see even a reversal of the declining 
trend in TFR in parts of country, especially in the poor rural areas where son preferences 
dominate and the government’s control is comparatively weak (Kahn 2007).  
The default values of the fertility scales in BEGIN and PEP, however, are slightly 
modified  downwards,  taking  into  account  the  large  size  of  the  Chinese  population 
compared to the European countries the default values are based on. The modification is 
mainly built on the following empirical evidence. Bongaarts and Bulatao (2000: 210, 339) 
estimated the relative error for the total population of China in 2050 at the lead time of 50 
years,  using  composite  bootstrap  procedures.  Based  on  the  European  data,  Alho  and 
Spencer (2005) showed that after a lead time of about 50 years the levels of forecast error   12 
are similar for fertility and mortality, thus, they were constrained to be equal at the end of 
the forecasting period. In this study, the scales for fertility, mortality and net migration 
were adjusted until the relative error for the total population in 2050 matched the estimate 
by Bongaarts and Bulatao (2000). This process resulted in a relative error for fertility of 
0.32 in 2050. 
In Figure 2 the predictive distribution of TFR is compared to the point forecast of TFR 
underlying the median scenario of the UN projection. The UN forecast is much higher; it 
assumes the TFR to converge toward a level of 1.85 in 2015 and is held constant at that 
level  for the remainder of the projection period (i.e., until 2050). The 80% prediction 
interval in this study covers the UN median forecast from 2028, and the 95% prediction 
interval  covers  that  from  2017  onwards.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  current  fertility 
assumptions differ considerably from those of the UN. However, assumptions used in this 
study seem plausible, given the magnitude of fertility changes during the past 30 years of 
birth control policies, and the confirmed continuation of these policies in the near future, 
as well as the change of the fertility ideal and fertility desire of the younger generations. 
These assumptions  lead to 80% prediction  intervals of [1.18, 1.83] in 2025 and [1.07, 
2.01] in 2050, and 95% prediction intervals of [1.11, 1.95] and [0.98, 2.20], respectively.  
----- Figure 2 is here ---- 
In addition, assumptions for two additional variables, the mean age of childbearing 
(MAC) and sex ratio at birth (SRB) are required for the forecast. During the 1990s, while 
the TFR declined, the MAC remained stable. In 2000, the fertility rate for parity 3 reached 
a very low level, and a substantial further decline therefore seems unlikely (Guo 2004). 
Thus, it was assumed that the MAC, without consideration of parity, will remain constant 
at 26.00 years until 2050. The SRB in China has begun to increase above the average 
(1.05) since the 1980s and has kept rising steeply, reaching 1.17 in 2000. A high incidence 
of prenatal sex determination and sex-selective abortion are the main causes of the high 
SRB (Hesketh and Xing 2006). This has caused a female deficit in the ages 0-19 of 19.81 
million in 2000 (Yuan and Tu 2005). Here, the point forecast of the SRB is expected to 
remain  constant  at  1.17,  since  there  is  currently  no  evidence  for  an  increasing  or 
decreasing trend in SRB in China.   13 
Mortality 
Age-specific mortality data for China are only available for the years 1973-1975, 1981, 
1990 and 2000. Data for the years 1981, 1990 and 2000 come from the census of 1982, 
1990  and  2000.  The  1973-1975  data  stem  from  the  nationwide  mortality  survey,  the 
“Cancer Epidemiology Survey” that attempted to record all deaths in nearly all of China’s 
counties and city districts for the 3-year period 1973-75. This survey provides age-sex-
cause-specific  mortality  rates  for  the  period  1973-75.  In  China,  the  years  1973-75 
represented the time when both rural and urban populations were covered by basic but 
efficient health-care systems (Banister and Hill 2004; Li, Lee and Tuljapukar 2004). By 
1981, the rural health-care system had collapsed, and the city health-care system became 
inadequate due to the Reform and Open Up policy launched in 1978.  
Mortality rates are given for single age-classes, but only up to age-class 90+. Thus, it 
was necessary to extrapolate mortality trajectories for the ages 90 to 100+. The Kannisto 
model  (Thatcher,  Kannisto,  and  Vaupel  1998;  Zeng  and  Vaupel  2003)  was  used  to 
extrapolate death rates up to age 100+.
8 As was the case for fertility data, the latest source 
of information on life tables comes from the 2000 census in China. 
Due to data limitations, mortality assumptions in the forecast were not only based on 
the observation of past trends in China, but also borrowed from other countries. The age-
specific rates of initial decline and ultimate decline in mortality are needed for the forecast. 
The  former  was  estimated  using  the  available  Chinese  data,  whereas  the  latter  was 
borrowed from the European countries.   
Since  its  establishment,  the  People’s  Republic  of  China  has  experienced  a  rapid 
decline in mortality. Life expectancy has increased from 48 years to over 71 years during 
the past 50 years, around 0.46 year per year (Banister and Hill 2004). In the past three 
decades, for both sexes, an improvement of mortality at most ages has been observed, 
except for ages 20-23 between 1973-75 and 1981 (Figure 3). The decline of mortality for 
men  has  been  more  modest than  for  women,  especially  in  adulthood (Figure  3).  One 
possible explanation is that the improvement of mortality for men has been slowed down 
by  sex-biased  occupational  and  lifestyle  factors,  such  as  smoking  and  alcohol 
consumption, while women have benefited from a steep decline in fertility, concentration 
of  childbearing  at  the  healthiest  ages,  longer  spacing  between  births,  and  the  use  of 
modern methods of birth control (Banister and Hill 2004).   14 
----- Figure 3 is here ---- 
It is believed that mortality will continue to decline in the oncoming years in China for 
the following two reasons. Firstly, there is room for decline. Life expectancy was 73.33 
years  for  female  and  69.63  years  for  male  in  2000,  which  is  far  behind  that  in  the 
European Union (2002: 81 years for female and 75 for male;  Eurostat 2005: 80) and 
Japan (2004: 85.58 years for female and 78.66 for male; Human Mortality Database 2006) 
currently. Secondly, there is no indication that the record life expectancy will slow or 
stagnate in the near future (Oeppen and Vaupel 2002; Alho et al. 2006). Therefore, the 
changes during 1973-75 to 2000 are used to calculate the rates of initial decline for age-
specific mortality (Figure 4: rate of initial decline). For forecasting purposes, the rates of 
initial decline were smoothed (using the “Running Median Smooth” procedure) and they 
were restricted to be positive. Mortality has continued to decline fastest at the youngest 
ages.  In  the  working  ages,  the  mortality  decline  for  females  exceeded  the  decline  for 
males. At old ages, mortality decline was small compared to other age groups, and the 
gender difference was rather small. Rate of initial decline (Figure 4) also indicates that the 
increase of life expectancy at birth in China during the past three decades was mainly due 
to the decline in infant, children and adult mortality rather than the decrease of mortality 
among older people. 
----- Figure 4 is here ---- 
As known from empirical evidence, when mortality at younger ages reaches a very 
low level, further decline becomes much more difficult to achieve. Then, improvement 
against mortality at older ages is likely to become the dominant force in the increase of life 
expectancy  (Olshansky  and  Ault  1986).  This  is  currently  the  case  in  many  European 
countries such as Germany, Sweden and Finland. Here, it is assumed that the pattern of 
mortality decline in China in 2050 will closely resemble the pattern shown by European 
countries  in  the  recent  past  (Figure  4:  rate  of  ultimate  decline).  This  seems  plausible 
because of epidemiological transitions changing the age distribution of deaths (Horiuchi 
1997).  That  is,  the  rates  of  decline  at  younger  ages,  especially  children  and  younger 
women, will decrease and the rates of decline at older ages will increase.  
Because the estimated initial rates of mortality decline for adult males are very low, 
much  scope  for  improvement  in  the  future  exists.  Adult  women’s  rates  of  mortality 
decline have already reached a relatively high level; therefore, the potential for a further 
decline  is  decreased.  Additionally,  rates  of  mortality  decline  might  decrease  because   15 
underemployment, which is likely to affecting women stronger than men, might lower 
relative  female  social  status  in  the  near  future.  As  a  result,  the  gender  differences  in 
mortality decline will  become smaller at younger ages. At older ages, both males and 
females are expected to experience higher rates of mortality decline, because new cohorts 
of the elderly may be healthier than older ones due to the improvement in living standards 
and medical progress, but biological gender differences may result in somewhat higher 
rates of decline for females than for males. The graph of rate of ultimate decline illustrates 
the smoothed rates of decline pattern for age-specific mortality (using Running Median 
Smooth) in current European countries, which have been used as the rates of ultimate 
decline in the forecast.  
As for fertility, due to lack of long time-series data on age-specific mortality, the error 
terms  estimated  by  Alho  and  Spencer  (2005)  for  nine  European  countries  (Austria, 
Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom) were borrowed. Those data end in 2000 and start at various times, the earliest 
being the United Kingdom in 1841. This was also a period of high volatility of mortality. 
For  China  the  scale  is  again  adjusted  to  a  lower  level  because  of  the  large  level  of 
heterogeneity in the population (Alho and Spencer 2005; Bongaarts and Bulatao 2000: 
210, 339). The relative error in 2050 is thus calculated as 0.32. The resulting 80% and 
95% predictive intervals for life expectancy are plotted in Figure 5.   
According  to  the  forecast  distribution,  life  expectancy  at  birth  for  both  sexes  will 
increase linearly at a rate of about 2 years per decade. In 2050 females are expected to 
enjoy a life expectancy of 84.88 years and males one of 79.72 years. The 80% prediction 
interval, for males will be [77.20, 82.20] in 2050, covering a range of 5 years (6.3% of the 
median estimate); for females it will be [82.50, 87.3] in 2050, covering 4.8 years (5.7% of 
the median estimate). The 95% prediction interval at 2050 covers more than 6 years for 
both sexes.  
Figure  5  also  compares  the  forecast  of  life  expectancy  to  the  medium  scenario 
projection of the UN. The UN  forecasts have traditionally  been rather conservative  in 
predicting  progress  against  mortality  and  have  generally  underestimated  future  life 
expectancy (Keilman 1998; Bongaarts and Bulatao 2000). Moreover, the forecast of life 
expectancy  in this study  seems to be plausible  considering the reinstatement of social 
security, especially the health-care system at the national level, which has already been   16 
pronounced as one of the most important tasks by the Chinese government for the set goal 
of  “Building a Harmonious Society” until 2020.   
----- Figure 5 is here ---- 
 
International migration 
Based on the 1990 census and the 1995 1% sample survey, emigration from China in 1995 
was  about  236,800  (Liang  2001).  In  2000,  the  net  migration  rate  for  China  was  -0.3 
migrants  per  1,000  of  population.  This  amounted  to  a  loss  of  approximately  381,000 
people.
9 This means that the net migration as a percentage of the total inhabitants was only 
0.03%. The UN forecast predicts that net annual migration will decrease from 390,000 to 
320,000 in 2050.
10 This forecast was used for point estimates in this projection.  
In contrast to fertility and mortality, the uncertainty of international migration is 
represented  in  absolute  numbers.  Its  autocorrelation  across  years  was  assumed  to  be 
constant. Analogous to fertility and mortality, the error terms for migration were borrowed 
from Europe, in this case 18 European countries (Alho and Nikander 2004). Again, based 
on empirical evidence it was assumed that China with its huge population and hence large 
heterogeneity should be buffered well against large shifts in migration (Alho et al. 2006: 
261). Therefore it seemed appropriate that the scale values S should be set relatively low. 
The  resulting  assumption  of  net  migration  with  its  associated  uncertainty  is  shown  in 
Figure 6. Negative values of net migration indicate a net out-migration, i.e., when more 
people  are  leaving  the  country  than  entering  it.  In  2050  the  80%  uncertainty  interval 
ranges from -39 to +6 million and the 95% bounds are at -46 and +12 million. 
----- Figure 6 is here ---- 
Indicators of population change 
Certain demographic indicators are especially suitable to describe changes in population 
size and structure. Period life expectancy gives the average lifespan of an individual if the 
current mortality conditions were to persist through life. The changes in the structure of 
the  population  over  time  can  be  visualized  by  population  pyramids  and  the  following 
measures of population structure: 
----- Table 2 is here ---- 
The division between male and female population is given by the sex ratio, defined as 
the male population divided by the female population.   17 
Results 
Total population size up to year 2050 
The median of the forecast distribution projects China’s total population to increase from 
the jump-off level of 1260 million at the end of 2000 to its maximum level at 1361 million 
people in 2024, and thereafter predicts it to decline to 1243 million people in 2050 (Figure 
7: total population). Note that due to the large number of simulation runs (3000), the mean 
and median are equal. The long increase despite the well-below replacement TFR is likely 
due to a strong population momentum.  
There is considerable uncertainty attached to the median estimates, including temporal 
as well a magnitude effects. The upper 80% prediction interval suggests an increase up to 
1430 million people in 2040, whereas the lower one estimates a peak population of only 
1314 million in 2020. In 2050 the 80% prediction interval covers a range of 1090 to 1419 
million (i.e., 26% of the median estimate). Compared to the Chinese population forecast of 
the United Nations World Population Prospects in 2004, the predictions lie for the largest 
part between the low and medium variant scenario. The difference is mainly due to the 
fact that the UN assumed a higher TFR, i.e., 1.85 (median variant) by mid-century, while 
we expect it to stabilize at 1.47 after 2004. Furthermore, the UN used rather conservative 
mortality assumptions underlying their population projection. 
The projected population development differs slightly for males and females. Whereas 
the male population will peak at 700 million in year 2023, the female population will 
reach its maximum size in 2025 at 661 million. Figure 7 shows that the gap between the 
number of males and females closes towards the end of the projection period, as females 
enjoy lower mortality at working ages and old ages. 
----- Figure 7 is here ---- 
Age-sex structures 
The population pyramids  in Figure 8  illustrate the evolving age-sex structure over the 
projection interval, visualizing the rapid rate of population aging. From the predominance 
of the childhood and working age class in current China, it is predicted to shift to an age-
structure characteristic of aging populations in Europe.  
----- Figure 8 is here ----   18 
The population snapshots shown in Figure 8 depict how the uncertainty spreads from 
the  youngest  age  classes  along  the  age  axis  over the  forecast  period.  For the  old  age 
classes, the slower growth of uncertainty reflects the lower initial level of uncertainty for 
mortality. This can be understood easily since the younger age classes are born during the 
forecast  years,  while  the  older  ones  were  already  born  before  2000.  As  a  result,  the 
younger age classes have a larger attached uncertainty than the older ones. After 50 years, 
the predictive distribution of the Chinese population composition ranges from a column-
like to a rather regressive age pyramid, with most of the uncertainty attached to the base of 
the pyramid. 
The rapid pace of population aging in China can also be seen in other indicators of 
population  age-structure (Table  3).  Life  expectancy  will  increase  consistently  for  both 
sexes (see Figure 5).  Due to steady improvement in mortality rates, the proportion of 
elderly (65+) is expected to increase nearly four-fold during the next 50 years from about 
7% [6.96, 6.98] in 2001 to 29% [24.4, 32.4] in 2050 – almost one third of the population. 
Combined  with  the  continuously  below-replacement  level  of  fertility,  the  decline  in 
mortality will raise the aging index even faster: a nine-fold increase from 28 [28.1, 28.3] 
in 2001 to 253 [152, 409] in 2050 is predicted. The median age of the total population 
increases from age 31 [31, 31] in 2001 to 52 [46, 56] in 2050.  
----- Table 3 is here ---- 
Table 4 shows the temporal development of sex-specific indicators of population age 
structure. The gender gap in life expectancy is predicted to increase moderately from 3.7 
years  in  2000  to  5.2  years  in  2050.  Due  to  the  lower  age-specific  mortality  rates  in 
females, by 2050, the age-sex-structure is expected to be highly asymmetrical with a sex 
ratio of 0.8 [0.74, 0.86] among the elderly and 0.6 [0.50, 0.71] among the oldest-old. As a 
further  consequence,  the  gender  differential  in  aging  will  increase  rapidly.  While  the 
median age of males and females is currently identical, by 2050, a gender gap of 4 years is 
expected to have opened up. Also, in absolute numbers the female older and oldest-old 
population increases much faster compared to those of the males, with the differentials 
being largest for the 80+ population. 
----- Table 4 is here ----   19 
Old age dependency ratio 
There remains no uncertainty to the fact that the OADR in China will rise steeply over the 
next 50 years (Figure 9): the median of the predictive distribution suggests a more than 
four-fold increase from 0.102 to 0.474 – from a level typical for Asian countries to one 
comparable to that expected in more developed countries such as Australia (Wilson and 
Bell 2004). Due to the highly biased sex-ratio at birth (1.17) and the lower mortality of 
females in working ages, the absolute numbers of population size for the ages 65+ and 
80+ increases much faster for females than for males.  
To evaluate how robust the OADR results are to the specific assumptions made in the 
forecast, they are compared with the OADR forecast of the UN. Regarding parameters of 
population aging, the OADR of 0.47 [0.41, 0.55] in 2050, predicted by the forecast in this 
study lies even above the low variant of the UN projection (upper grey dashed line in 
Figure 9). The higher fertility assumption of the UN and a potential bias in the predicted 
mortality decline may result in a lower OADR (Li, Lee, and Tuljapukar 2004).  
----- Figure 9 is here ---- 
Probabilistic forecasts for 18 European countries predict a total European OADR of 
0.57 in 2050 (Alho et al. 2006). Note however, that Alho et al. use a slightly different 
definition of the OADR for the European forecast, namely, using age group 20-64 instead 
of  15-64  as  denominator.  If  that  definition  were  applied  in  this  study,  the  forecasted 
OADR  would  increase  to  0.51  [0.44,  0.58]  and  be  even  closer  to  the  OADR  of  the 
European countries in 2050.  
It is important to note though that for the European countries, in the period 2000 to 
2050, the OADR as defined above will double from 0.28 to 0.57. As mentioned before, 
China will reach a level of 0.51 in 2050, using the Alho et al. (2006) definition, but starts 
off from a much lower level, namely around 0.1 in 2000. Hence the OADR will multiply 
by 5.1 over the 50 projection years. This means that the pace of aging is more than twice 
as fast in China as in Europe.  
The oldest-old (80+) class will expand even more rapidly than the total old age class 
(65+) (Figure 10). According to the median of the projection, the oldest-old dependency 
ratio (OODR) will multiply by more than 10 for both sexes; from 0.014 in 2001 to 0.15 in 
2050. Figure 10 shows a sharp increase after 2040 that can be explained by the baby-boom 
cohort born in the 1960s that will reach the oldest-old class in 2040. (See also Figure 1).    20 
----- Figure 10 is here ---- 
 
Discussion 
This paper reports the results of a stochastic population forecast for China until 2050 with 
a focus on the process of population aging, and quantifies the expected uncertainty. Data 
limitation  is  a  big  challenge  in  projecting  the  Chinese  population.  Thus,  in  this  study 
forecast  errors  estimated  for  some  European  countries  with  long-term  and  reliable 
historical data were borrowed, and some adjustments on scales were  made, taking the 
large size and heterogeneity of the Chinese population  into consideration. The relative 
error of the total population at the lead time of 50 years (i.e., in 2050) matches the one 
estimated by Bongaarts and Bulatao (2000: 210, 339). The rationale behind this paper is to 
make use of all available empirical sources to forecast the population stochastically, while 
acknowledging the uncertainty of the estimates, resulting from the country’s lack of data. 
The key result of this study is that while there is considerable uncertainty attached to the 
predicted development of Chinese population size over the next 50 years, there can hardly 
be any doubt that the Chinese population is aging quickly. The proportion of the elderly 
population and the OADR will increase rapidly, which will lead to a heavy burden of 
support for the huge elderly population in China.  
 
Population aging is certain in China 2001-2050 
The extremely rapid pace of population aging in the first half of this century is the most 
important and worrisome development in China. By mid-century, with 80% probability 
the OADR will lie between 0.41 and 0.55, with the median of predictive distribution being 
0.47, nearly five times the current number. This rapid population aging process results 
from  the  steep  fertility  decline  since  the  1970s (assuming  TFR=1.47  remains  constant 
from 2004 to 2050) on the one hand, and progress against mortality on the other. While 
the extraordinary fertility decrease since the 1970s has produced smaller cohorts of young 
people, the improvement in  mortality decline will enable the  large  baby-boom cohorts 
born in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s to survive to old age. The increase in the OADR 
is the main factor leading to concerns about the sustainability of public old-age pensions 
(Alho et al. 2006).    21 
Between 2001 and 2050, the population of the oldest-old will grow faster than any 
other age group in China. The OODR will be ten times as large compared to its current 
value (from 0.014 to 0.15). In 2050, with 80% probability the OODR will lie between 0.11 
and 0.19. The share of the oldest-old to the elderly will increase sharply, especially after 
2040 when the 1960s baby-boom cohort enters the oldest-old class. Moreover, due to the 
huge population in China, the absolute size of the oldest-old class is very large. Members 
of this class differ from those of the young-old class: they are much more likely to have 
extensive co-morbidity, and the decline of their functional ability accelerates with age 
(Baltes and Smith 2003; Fries et al. 2000; Zeng et al. 2002). Thus, they consume amounts 
of services, benefits and transfers far out of proportion to their population share (Suzman, 
Willis,  and  Manton  1992).  Taken  together,  this  indicates  the  necessity  to  prepare  for 
providing sufficient care giving, services, benefits and transfers for this rapidly growing 
part of the population. 
It should be recalled, however, that one of the forecasting assumptions used was that 
the ultimate rates of decline  in  mortality will  be equal to those in European countries 
currently. In case China does not achieve the same rates of decline in mortality as Europe, 
the current results for population size, life expectancy and OADR will be somewhat biased 
high. The reasoning behind this assumption is two-fold. The first is the lack of relevant 
data to estimate the ultimate rates of mortality decline. The second is that, based on the 
epidemiological  transitions,  the  mortality  decline  of  current  European  population 
represents a plausible trend in the mortality decline of the future Chinese population. How 
far  the  other  crucial  assumption  of  the  forecasting  scenario  will  be  met,  that  is,  the 
constant below-replacement level of TFR=1.47, will largely depend on Chinese fertility 
policy decisions in the oncoming years. 
This  forecast  points  towards  severe  disadvantages  for  elderly  women  in  China. 
Because females have a higher life expectancy than males, the share of older females in 
the population is larger and increases faster than for males. Moreover, this gap increases 
over age and the projected time period (see Table 4). Some previous studies have shown 
that elderly Chinese women are much more likely to be widowed and economically more 
dependent (Zeng and George 2000). At the same time, the social security for them is much 
poorer than for their male counterparts (Jia 2006). In short, women’s quality of life in old 
age will be at risk.  
   22 
Policy implications 
Facing such a dramatically rapid pace of population aging, what are the measures Chinese 
decision-makers should consider? Potential counter-strategies should address the causes as 
well as the symptoms of population aging, i.e., including adjustments of fertility policies 
and elderly support systems.  
China should smoothly adjust its current birth control policies toward a less restrictive 
one  that  allows  more  couples  to  have  more  than  one  child.  The  present  fertility 
assumptions, i.e., a TFR of 1.47 and a SRB of 1.17 until 2050, are mainly based on the 
current  birth  control  policies.  The  future  elderly  of  the  forecasting  period  have  been 
already born, but an increase in fertility would result in a higher percentage of people in 
the working ages. At the macro level, this would increase the denominator and thus reduce 
the OADR. At the micro level, adjusting fertility policy would also be helpful in reducing 
adult children’s burden in the support of their elderly parents because there will be siblings 
to share the load. It is important to remember that in China, due to its huge population, any 
change in population policy could result in large absolute changes. Thus, any adjustment 
should be planned very carefully. How to adjust the fertility policy exactly is beyond the 
present research. Further forecasting that focuses on policy making could help to evaluate 
potential effects of different fertility policies on population aging. 
In today’s China, the family support system which has worked for thousands of years 
still plays the dominant role on supporting the elderly. Old age insurance programs are 
insufficient and poor, especially in rural areas. China has not yet found a good model to 
build up a functioning old age insurance program. More than 20% of urban residents have 
no  social  security  at  all,  and  the  remainder  of  the  urban  population  is  covered  by 
inadequate social security. The majority of rural residents are without any social security 
at present. Thus, in the next 50 years, besides continuing to encourage family support 
through rewarding people who live with their old parents by measures such as adequate 
tax exemption and favorable housing policy, China should devote resources to establish 
age  insurance  and  healthcare  programs.  Fortunately,  the  Chinese  government  has  now 
realized  that  the  lack  of  a  sufficient  social  security  system  will  impede  sustainable 
development in China. Establishing a functioning social security system is one of the most 
important tasks in the set goal of “Building a Harmonious Society” by 2020. As discussed 
here, the severe disadvantages elderly women are confronted with require special attention 
from family, society and government. Old age insurance programs should benefit older   23 
women and men equally, and care services should take elderly women’s poorer health and 
economic status into account.    24 
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TABLE 1  Sources of the data used in the forecast 
Forecast parameters  Data sources 
Jump-off population  2000 census, and adjustments by Wang (2004) 
Fertility   




Annual TFR, 1950-2000  Fertility surveys conducted by SFPC 
Yearly data from NBS 
2000 census 
Mean age at childbearing   2000 census, Guo (2004) 
Mortality   
Jump-off values for age-specific mortality rates  2000 census 




Rate of ultimate declines   Current European rates (from BEGIN program) 
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TABLE 2 Measures of population aging and their definitions 
Measure  Definition 
Proportion of elderly  population 65+ / total population 
Aging Index  population 65+ / per 100 of population 0-14 
Old Age Dependency Ratio  population 65+ / population 15-64 
Oldest-old Dependency Ratio  population 80+ / population 15-64 
Median age  median age of the total population 
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TABLE 3 Population aging: temporal development of age structure indicators 
Demographic indicator  2001  2020  2035  2050 
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TABLE 4 Sex-specific indicators of population aging 
  2001  2035  2050 
Indicator  Male  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female 
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FIGURE 1  Total fertility rates in China in 1950-2000 and future trajectory of 
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1997 sampling survey by SFPC
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FIGURE 2  Estimated developments of total fertility rate and 
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FIGURE 3  Observed log(mx) at ages 0-89 and extrapolated log(mx) at ages 90-100+ 
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FIGURE 4  Smoothed rates of decline in age-specific mortality used in the 
forecast. Rate of initial declines were estimated using Chinese data 
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FIGURE 5  Estimated life expectancy at birth and prediction interval bounds for 






























































   34 



























































   35 
FIGURE 7  Projected  development  of  China’s  total  population  in  millions  and  
  80%  prediction  intervals  compared  to  UN  high,  medium  and  low 
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FIGURE 8  Population  pyramids  for  2001,  2025,  2035  and  2050  and  80% 
uncertainty   intervals. Inner pyramid shows  lower boundary (10%) 
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FIGURE 9  Predicted OADR and 80% prediction intervals, compared to 
  UN forecasts low, medium and high variants. (UN high variant 
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FIGURE 10  Total predicted OODR, and predicted ratio of 80+ population over 
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Notes: 
                                                 
1 Most  developed  countries  have  used  the  age  of  65  to  define  old  age.  In  China,  the 
definition of old by law is based on the retirement age. Currently, the official retirement 
age for Chinese males is 60 and for females it is 55. Accordingly, some Chinese scholars 
use the age of 60 to calculate their statistical results. For the sake of comparability to other 
countries, the present paper uses the age of 65 and over. 
2 Currently, in cities, if both wife and husband are single-child, they are allowed to have 
two children. 
3 In  the  2000  census,  time  and  space  standard  for  permanent  residents  were  adjusted, 
compared with the previous census in 1990. The time standard for permanent residents 
was reduced from one  year to six  months. The space standard was also reduced from 
county  (city)  to  township  (street)  in  order  to  reflect  the  increased  mobility  in  the 
population.  
4  In  order  to  project  the  population  forward  to  31  December  2000,  the  mortality 




) ( ( year dec nov x q q =
- . 
In case the mortality in November and December 2000 was in fact higher than during 
the remainder of the year, the estimated mortality probabilities will be underestimated and 
the jump-off population estimates will be slightly biased upward. 
Analogously, for fertility, the number of births was assumed to be constant over the 
months of the given  year. Therefore, birth numbers  in November and December were 
obtained by simply multiplying the number of births in a year by 61/365. These births 
were then “survived” until 31 December 2000. 
5 In the current application, the Karup-King formula for interpolation caused unreliable 
results  for the  first  ages,  which  is  also  explained  in Shryock (1976). The Karup-King 
coefficients  resulted  in  negative  ASFR  for  the  ages  15  and  16,  which  is  of  course 
impossible.  Therefore,  the  ASFR  by  single  years  from  1992  were  used  to  obtain  the 
distribution of ASFR between ages 15 and 19. Finally, the single-year ASFR from age 15 
to 49 years were applied in PEP as a basis for the forecast. 
6 For  estimates  of  target  TFR  see  the  article  by  Gu  et  al.  (2007)  in  Population  and 
Development Review.    40 
                                                                                                                                             
7 Birth  control  policies  have  been  adjusted  to  some  extent  to  avoid  the  4:2:1  family 
structure (4:2:1 family structure is 4 grandparents, 2 parents and 1 child). For example, if 
both parents are single children, they are allowed to have two children.  
8 Three models were examined to describe the hazard function for China: (1) Gompertz, 
(2) logistic and (3) Kannisto. The latter two were considered because existing evidence 
suggests that at older ages the increase in mortality decelerates (Thatcher, Kannisto, and 
Vaupel, 1998). Models were fitted using maximum likelihood estimation;  model selection 
was  based  on  Akaike’s  Information  Criterion  (AIC)  as  described  by  Burnham  and 
Anderson  (2002).  For  each  year-sex  combination,  the  Kannisto  model  was  strongly 
supported by the data.  
9 See www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Asia-and-Oceania/China-migration.html 
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